Asset delegation, career concerns and trade volume

Scotti, M

Asset delegation, career concerns and trade volume

Scotti, M

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Publisher:: Financial Management Association
Publication Type:: Conference Proceeding
Citation:: Financial Management Association 2010 Meetings, 2010, pp. 1 - 54
Issue Date:: 2010-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Scotti, M https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1179-6521	en_US
dc.contributor.editor	al, AAE	en_US
dc.date	2010-10-20	en_US
dc.date.issued	2010-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Financial Management Association 2010 Meetings, 2010, pp. 1 - 54	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/16665
dc.description.abstract	The paper analyzes the e¤ects of career concerns of portfolio managers on their incentives to trade in a order-driven market. We show that career concerns lead portfolio managers to trade even whithout valuable informa- tion, and hence even when they expect a negative return from trading. We then analyze how managers reacts to changes in asset volatility and .nd that uninformed managers facing career concerns trade larger quantities as asset riskiness increases. As a testable empirical implication, the model predicts that increasing levels of institutional ownership in .nancial markets lead to higher trading volumes that are positively correlated with asset volatility.	en_US
dc.publisher	Financial Management Association	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Financial Management Association 2010 Meetings	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Financial Management Association Annual Meeting	en_US
dc.title	Asset delegation, career concerns and trade volume	en_US
dc.type	Conference Proceeding
utslib.location	New York, USA	en_US
utslib.location.activity	New York, USA	en_US
utslib.for	150103 Financial Accounting	en_US
dc.location.activity	New York, USA	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.declined	1970-01-01T00:00:00.0+1000
pubs.consider-herdc	true	en_US
pubs.place-of-publication	New York, USA	en_US
pubs.start-date	2010-10-20	en_US

Abstract:

The paper analyzes the e¤ects of career concerns of portfolio managers on their incentives to trade in a order-driven market. We show that career concerns lead portfolio managers to trade even whithout valuable informa- tion, and hence even when they expect a negative return from trading. We then analyze how managers reacts to changes in asset volatility and .nd that uninformed managers facing career concerns trade larger quantities as asset riskiness increases. As a testable empirical implication, the model predicts that increasing levels of institutional ownership in .nancial markets lead to higher trading volumes that are positively correlated with asset volatility.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/16665