| Field |
Value |
Language |
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dc.contributor.author |
Suzuki, T
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1804-7416
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dc.date.accessioned |
2025-03-20T03:36:38Z |
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dc.date.available |
2025-03-20T03:36:38Z |
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dc.date.issued |
2025-06 |
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dc.identifier.citation |
International Journal of Game Theory, 2025, 54, (1), pp. 9 |
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dc.identifier.issn |
0020-7276 |
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dc.identifier.issn |
1432-1270 |
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dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/10453/186039
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dc.description.abstract |
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>
<jats:p>This paper introduces a common-interest communication game that generates pragmatics, where meaning emerges from the use of a preexisting language under equilibrium selection driven solely by efficiency. A key feature is that the sender describes the current state to the receiver by combining preexisting statements. This approach allows us to formalize two communication frictions: (i) longer descriptions incur higher costs, and (ii) with some probability, the receiver interprets only the conventional meaning. The absence of one friction leads to some efficient equilibria exhibiting pragmatics that disregards conventional meaning. However, when communication costs are sufficiently small, given the other friction, any efficient equilibrium exhibits natural pragmatics that refines conventional meaning, reflecting the context provided by the probability distribution of states. The resulting equilibrium pragmatics aligns with major linguistic theories, including Grice’s cooperative principle (1975) and Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory (1986).</jats:p> |
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dc.language |
en |
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dc.publisher |
Springer Nature |
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dc.relation.ispartof |
International Journal of Game Theory |
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dc.relation.isbasedon |
10.1007/s00182-025-00936-4 |
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dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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dc.subject |
0102 Applied Mathematics, 0104 Statistics, 1401 Economic Theory |
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dc.subject.classification |
Economic Theory |
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dc.subject.classification |
3801 Applied economics |
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dc.subject.classification |
3803 Economic theory |
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dc.subject.classification |
4901 Applied mathematics |
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dc.title |
Communication frictions and equilibrium pragmatics |
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dc.type |
Journal Article |
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utslib.citation.volume |
54 |
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utslib.for |
0102 Applied Mathematics |
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utslib.for |
0104 Statistics |
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utslib.for |
1401 Economic Theory |
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pubs.organisational-group |
University of Technology Sydney |
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pubs.organisational-group |
University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business |
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pubs.organisational-group |
University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline |
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pubs.organisational-group |
University of Technology Sydney/UTS Groups |
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pubs.organisational-group |
University of Technology Sydney/UTS Groups/Centre for Behavioural Science and Policy Design (CBSPD) |
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pubs.organisational-group |
University of Technology Sydney/UTS Groups/Behavioural-Lab (BL) |
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utslib.copyright.status |
open_access |
* |
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dc.rights.license |
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0). To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
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dc.date.updated |
2025-03-20T03:36:36Z |
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pubs.issue |
1 |
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pubs.publication-status |
Published online |
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pubs.volume |
54 |
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utslib.citation.issue |
1 |
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